CS286r Computational Mechanism Design: Project Suggestions Spring, 2005

The goal of the final project is to develop a deep understanding of an important research area, and, to the extent possible, to work on an open problem. You may also review an existing area of the literature, providing a careful and critical comparison of different approaches to computational mechanism design. You are strongly encouraged to build from the discussions in class, and to also remember that there are a few papers still to be covered. Projects may be theoretical or experimental; theoretical projects must be individual, while experimental projects can be completed in pairs. A list of suggested topics for projects are provided here, but you are encouraged to propose a topic of your own for approval. Project proposals are due in class on Wednesday, April 13. Your proposal will probably not need to be more than a couple of pages in length. Your goal should be to convince me that your ideas are well enough focused, and that you know what the first few steps will be. You should explicitly include the following sections in your proposal:

[1]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items , 2005, SODA '05.

[2]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions , 2004, AAAI.

[3]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  A study of limited-precision, incremental elicitation in auctions , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[4]  Aranyak Mehta,et al.  AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching , 2005, FOCS.

[5]  Andrew V. Goldberg,et al.  Envy-free auctions for digital goods , 2003, EC '03.

[6]  Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi,et al.  Online auctions with re-usable goods , 2005, EC '05.

[7]  Ryan Porter,et al.  Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling , 2004, EC '04.

[8]  Felix Brandt,et al.  (Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[9]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions , 2003, 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings..