Do visual perspective tasks need theory of mind?

Reviews [Frith, U., Frith, C.D., 2003. Development and neurophysiology of mentalising. Philos. Trans. R. Soc., B 358, 685-694.] of several imaging studies report robust involvement of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in "theory of mind" (ToM) tasks. Surprisingly, this activation is notably absent when judging another person's visual perspective [Vogeley, K., May, M., Ritzl, A., Falkai, P., Zilles, K., Fink, G.R., 2004. Neural correlates of first-person perspective as one constituent of human self-consciousness. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 817-827.]. The objective of our study was to see whether this activation can be recovered when the difference between what observers see is clearly one of perspectives (in front vs. behind) and not potentially a difference in what observers are looking at. Despite this change, there was still no apparent activation of MPFC. We did find activation in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) recently emphasized as centrally involved in processing false belief stories [Saxe, R., Kanwisher, N., 2003. People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in "theory of mind". NeuroImage 19, 1835-1842.], which also create a stark contrast of perspectives. By integrating extant neurophysiological evidence on theory of mind processing, we suggest that the dorsal part of the TPJ region is responsible for representing perspective differences and making behavioral predictions, while the more ventral part of TPJ and the MPFC region is responsible for predicting behavioral consequences and the MPFC also emotional consequences of mental states.

[1]  A. Holmes.  Generalisability, random effects and population inference (abstract) , 1998 .

[2]  C. Polkey,et al.  "Theory of mind" impairments and their relationship to executive functioning following frontal lobe excisions. , 2001, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[3]  Josef Perner,et al.  What is a Perspective Problem? Developmental Issues in Belief Ascription and Dual Identity , 2003, Facta Philosophica.

[4]  G. Glover,et al.  Reflecting upon Feelings: An fMRI Study of Neural Systems Supporting the Attribution of Emotion to Self and Other , 2004, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[5]  U. Frith,et al.  The impact of extensive medial frontal lobe damage on 'Theory of Mind' and cognition. , 2004, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[6]  N. Block.  On a confusion about a function of consciousness , 1995, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[7]  Henrik Walter,et al.  Understanding Intentions in Social Interaction: The Role of the Anterior Paracingulate Cortex , 2004, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[8]  J. Decety,et al.  A PET Investigation of the Attribution of Intentions with a Nonverbal Task , 2000, NeuroImage.

[9]  T. Nagel.  Mortal Questions: What is it like to be a bat? , 2012 .

[10]  Christopher D. Frith,et al.  Imaging the Intentional Stance in a Competitive Game , 2002, NeuroImage.

[11]  F. C. S. Schiller,et al.  A Critical Account of the Doctrine of Lotze. , 1895 .

[12]  Richard S. J. Frackowiak,et al.  Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of “theory of mind” in story comprehension , 1995, Cognition.

[13]  J. Flavell,et al.  The early development of inferences about the visual percepts of others. , 1974, Child development.

[14]  土肥 一夫,et al.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current Englishと英和辞典 , 2001 .

[15]  C. Frith,et al.  Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: an fMRI study of ‘theory of mind’ in verbal and nonverbal tasks , 2000, Neuropsychologia.

[16]  R. Dolan,et al.  An fMRI study of intentional and unintentional (embarrassing) violations of social norms. , 2002, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[17]  F. M.,et al.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English , 1929, Nature.

[18]  P. Skudlarski,et al.  The role of the fusiform face area in social cognition: implications for the pathobiology of autism. , 2003, Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences.

[19]  D. Stuss,et al.  The frontal lobes are necessary for 'theory of mind'. , 2001, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[20]  G. Csibra,et al.  The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis , 1998 .

[21]  R. E Passingham,et al.  Inferring false beliefs from the actions of oneself and others: an fMRI study , 2004, NeuroImage.

[22]  Thomas E. Nichols,et al.  Optimization of experimental design in fMRI: a general framework using a genetic algorithm , 2003, NeuroImage.

[23]  A. Leslie.  Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind." , 1987 .

[24]  J. Flavell,et al.  Young children's knowledge about visual perception: Further evidence for the Level 1–Level 2 distinction. , 1981 .

[25]  S. Baron-Cohen,et al.  Theory of mind in patients with frontal variant frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer's disease: theoretical and practical implications. , 2002, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[26]  Michael B. Miller,et al.  Neural Correlates of Detecting Pretense: Automatic Engagement of the Intentional Stance under Covert Conditions , 2004, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[27]  Karl J. Friston,et al.  Generalisability, Random Effects & Population Inference , 1998, NeuroImage.

[28]  Glyn W. Humphreys,et al.  Frontal and Temporo-Parietal Lobe Contributions to Theory of Mind: Neuropsychological Evidence from a False-Belief Task with Reduced Language and Executive Demands , 2004, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[29]  B. Bower.  A Child's Theory of Mind , 1993 .

[30]  Dana Samson,et al.  Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief , 2004, Nature Neuroscience.

[31]  J. Decety,et al.  How Would You Feel versus How Do You Think She Would Feel? A Neuroimaging Study of Perspective-Taking with Social Emotions , 2004, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[32]  Daniel Houser,et al.  A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange , 2001, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[33]  C. Frith,et al.  Interacting minds--a biological basis. , 1999, Science.

[34]  Jeffrey M. Zacks,et al.  Imagined Viewer and Object Rotations Dissociated with Event-Related fMRI , 2003, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[35]  C. Frith,et al.  Movement and Mind: A Functional Imaging Study of Perception and Interpretation of Complex Intentional Movement Patterns , 2000, NeuroImage.

[36]  J. Perner.  Understanding the Representational Mind , 1993 .

[37]  C. Frith,et al.  Functional imaging of ‘theory of mind’ , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[38]  J. Decety,et al.  Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency , 2001, Nature Neuroscience.

[39]  F. J. Langdon,et al.  The Child's Conception of Space , 1967 .

[40]  R Saxe,et al.  People thinking about thinking people The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind” , 2003, NeuroImage.

[41]  H. Wimmer,et al.  Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception , 1983, Cognition.

[42]  Josef Perner,et al.  Theory of mind finds its Piagetian perspective: why alternative naming comes with understanding belief , 2002 .

[43]  J. Dupré.  The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory , 2000 .

[44]  C. Frith,et al.  Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. , 2003, Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences.

[45]  Dana Samson,et al.  Seeing it my way: a case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. , 2005, Brain : a journal of neurology.

[46]  C. Stichel,et al.  The mouse MPTP model: gene expression changes in dopaminergic neurons , 2003, The European journal of neuroscience.

[47]  Uta Frith,et al.  Theory of mind , 2001, Current Biology.

[48]  Richard S. J. Frackowiak,et al.  ‘Theory of mind’ in the brain. Evidence from a PET scan study of Asperger syndrome , 1996, Neuroreport.

[49]  K. Zilles,et al.  Mind Reading: Neural Mechanisms of Theory of Mind and Self-Perspective , 2001, NeuroImage.

[50]  J. Decety,et al.  What you believe versus what you think they believe: a neuroimaging study of conceptual perspective‐taking , 2003, The European journal of neuroscience.

[51]  R. Saxe,et al.  Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction , 2005, Neuropsychologia.

[52]  K. Zilles,et al.  Neural Correlates of First-Person Perspective as One Constituent of Human Self-Consciousness , 2004, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[53]  M. Hallett,et al.  Modeling other minds , 1995, Neuroreport.