Game of Duplicity: A Proactive Automated Defense Mechanism by Deception Design

We present a new game framework called the duplicity game to design defensive deception mechanisms. The mechanism provides the defender with a proactive and automated way to enhance security by defensive deception. Unlike encryption which hides a secret, our mechanism achieves deception overtly; i.e., the user recognizes the potential deception, yet still has the incentive to participate in the mechanism and follow the defender's regulation. The deception mechanism consists of the joint design of a policy generator, an incentive manipulator, and a trust modulator. A case study of discriminative honeypot configuration is presented to validate the deception mechanism design.

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