On top responsiveness and strict core stability
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Abstract Alcalde and Revilla [Journal of Mathematical Economics 40 (2004) 869–887] introduce a top responsiveness condition on players’ preferences in hedonic games and show that it guarantees the existence of a core stable partition. In the present note we strengthen this observation by proving that under top responsiveness even the strict core is non-empty.
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