Tolerance-Based Group Scoring Scheme Promotes Cooperation in Public Goods Game

The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has always been a subject of considerable concern in various fields, such as economics, sociobiology and social science. Previous studies have shown that reputation can sustain cooperation in multi-player public goods games through indirect reciprocity. Unfortunately, most studies only consider the impact of personal performance, and while the effect of group performance is still unclear. Here, we propose a reputation mechanism that combines the groups' performance and players' performance. Simulations show that the situation only consider group scoring can not sustain cooperation, but when the players' difference is considered, the population will achieve a high level of cooperation.

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