The work of John Nash in game theory

Harold W. Kuhn, Department of Mathematics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544, USA John C. Harsanyi, The Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720, USA Reinhard Selten, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany Jo rgen W. Weibull, 1 Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden Eric van Damme, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands John. F. Nash, Jr., Department of Mathematics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544, USA Peter Hammerstein, Max-Planck-Institure fu r Verhaltensphysiologie, 82319 Seewiesen, Germany

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