Game theory models of peace and war

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the game theory models of peace and war. Game theory's relevance to peace and war was controversial from the start. The debate has continued up to the present day, but it has been conducted mostly in the abstract, with critics trying to prove a priori that game theory is inapplicable. Some aspects of international relations (IR) game theory discussed in the chapter are game analyses of specific international situations; the debate on realism and international cooperation; international negotiations; models of arms building, deterrence, and signaling resolve; the myth that game theory shaped nuclear-deterrence strategy; first-strike stability, and the outbreak of war, escalation; alliances; and arms-control verification. Game-theoretical studies of verification are divided into two groups. The first involves decisions about allocating inspection resources or a quota of inspections limited by treaty. The second asks whether to cheat and whether to accuse in the face of ambiguous evidence. The chapter also discusses military game theory.

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