TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: AN INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT

This paper identifies contexts in which trust and reciprocation are likely to arise. Using an experimental trust game we examine the influence of country, social distance and communication on trust and reciprocation in China, Japan, Korea, and the United States. We find mixed support for the commonly-accepted negative relationship between trust and social distance across the four countries. While social distance has the expected effect in the US, its effects internationally are more complex. We also show that even irrelevant communication influences game behavior, but that it is personal discussion rather than impersonal, that produces significantly higher levels of trust.

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