Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets with Acceptable Bundles

We extend the Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) mechanism to select strict core allocations for housing markets with multiple types of items, where each agent may be endowed and allocated with multiple items of each type. In doing so, we advance the state of the art in mechanism design for housing markets along two dimensions: First, our setting is more general than multi-type housing markets (Moulin 1995; Sikdar, Adali, and Xia 2017) and the setting of Fujita et al. (2015). Further, we introduce housing markets with acceptable bundles (HMABs) as a more general setting where each agent may have arbitrary sets of acceptable bundles. Second, our extension of TTC is strict core selecting under the weaker restriction on preferences of CMI-trees, which we introduce as a new domain restriction on preferences that generalizes commonly-studied languages in previous works.

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