On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games

We report the results of a coordination game experiment. The experiment carefully distinguishes between conventions based on labels and conventions based on populations. Our labels treatments investigate the abstraction assumptions that underlie the concept of a strategy, while our population treatments investigate the attraction of alternative mutually consistent ways to play under adaptive behaviour. We observe conventions emerging in communities with one population and labels and with two populations and no labels, but the most effective treatment is two labelled populations. We estimate logistic response learning models for individual subject behaviour. Of the models considered, a version of exponential fictitious play fits our data best.

[1]  John C. Harsanyi,et al.  Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games , 1989 .

[2]  A. Ortmann,et al.  On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games , 1995 .

[3]  L. Samuelson,et al.  EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC GAMES , 1990 .

[4]  V. Crawford,et al.  Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games , 1990 .

[5]  E. Vandamme.  Stability and perfection of nash equilibria , 1987 .

[6]  D. Friedman.  Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results , 1996 .

[7]  John B. Van Huyck,et al.  Adaptive behavior and coordination failure , 1997 .

[8]  Larry Samuelson,et al.  Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games , 1991 .

[9]  R. Sugden.  The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare , 1986 .

[10]  Adam Brandenburger,et al.  Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games , 1992 .

[11]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Learning in Games , 1998 .

[12]  Thomas R. Saving,et al.  History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions , 1992, Journal of Political Economy.

[13]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .

[14]  H. Young,et al.  The Evolution of Conventions , 1993 .

[15]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Game Theory and Economic Modelling , 1992 .

[16]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Learning Mixed Equilibria , 1993 .

[17]  D. Friedman.  EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN ECONOMICS , 1991 .

[18]  Roman E. Maeder,et al.  Programming in Mathematica , 1989 .

[19]  Robert Forsythe,et al.  Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results , 1987 .

[20]  Alvin E. Roth,et al.  Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study , 1982 .

[21]  Tilman Börgers,et al.  Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics , 1997 .

[22]  Paul G. Straub.  Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games , 1995 .

[23]  David Lewis.  Convention: A Philosophical Study , 1986 .

[24]  Jörgen W. Weibull,et al.  Evolutionary Game Theory , 1996 .

[25]  L. Samuelson,et al.  Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games , 1992 .

[26]  John B. Van Huyck,et al.  Credible assignments in coordination games , 1992 .

[27]  J. Huyck,et al.  Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure , 1990 .

[28]  R. Kirk.  CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY , 1970 .

[29]  T. W. Ross,et al.  Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Preplaycommunication , 1994 .

[30]  R. Bloomfield.  Learning a mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory , 1994 .

[31]  J. Huyck,et al.  Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games , 1991 .

[32]  V. Crawford.  An “evolutionary” interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination , 1991 .

[33]  Dilip Mookherjee,et al.  Learning behavior in an experimental matching pennies game , 1994 .

[34]  R. Sugden.  A Theory of Focal Points , 1995 .

[35]  K Sigmund,et al.  The theory of evolution and dynamic systems mathematical aspects of selection , 1984 .

[36]  Ken Binmore,et al.  Focal points and bargaining , 1993 .

[37]  J. Huyck,et al.  Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication , 1993 .

[38]  B. Bernheim.  Rationalizable Strategic Behavior , 1984 .

[39]  Daniel Friedman,et al.  Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results☆☆☆ , 1997 .

[40]  M. Hirsch,et al.  Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear Algebra , 1974 .