论文信息 - Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information

Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information

This paper provides a characterization of correlated equilibria in two-person repeated games with lack of information on one side when the role of the informed player consists exclusively of transmitting information. The result is an analog to the “folk-theorem”.

F. Forges | F. Forges | FranÃ§oise Forges

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