Political Power and Economic Policy: Theory, Analysis, and Empirical Applications

Part I. Political Power and Economic Analysis: 1. Public policy: the lens of political economy 2. The Nash solution to the bargaining problem 3. The Harsanyi solution to the bargaining problem 4. Political-economic analysis 5. Normative political-economic analysis 6. Dynamic political-economic analysis Part II. Ideology, Prescription, and Political Power Coefficients: 7. Political power, ideology, and political organizational structures 8. Political power, influence, and lobbying 9. Constitutional prescription and political power coefficients Part III. Analysis of Specific Structures: 10. The political economy of commodity market intervention 11. The political economy of public research and development 12. Political-economic analysis of redistributive policy and public good investments 13. Interest groups, coalition breaking, and productive policies 14. Policy reform and compensation 15. Political-economic analysis of land reform 16. Political-economic analysis of water resource systems 17. The political-economic lens on quality and public standard regulations 18. Political-economic analysis in transition economies 19. The power of bureaucracies: the European commission and EU policy reforms Part IV. Empirical Applications of Political Power Estimation: 20. Political econometrics 21. The political econometrics of the Israeli dairy industry 22. Flexible policy instruments given a political power distribution 23. Estimating statistical properties of power weight parameters and their temporal shifts 24. Role of institutions in the joint determination of PERTs and PESTs.

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