Reasons for Secrecy and Deception in Homeland‐Security Resource Allocation

In this article, we explore reasons that a defender might prefer secrecy or deception about her defensive resource allocations, rather than disclosure, in a homeland‐security context. Our observations not only summarize and synthesize the results of existing game‐theoretic work, but also provide intuitions about promising future research directions.

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