Terrorism & Game Theory

This keynote paper examines how game-theoretic analyses of terrorism have provided some policy insights that do not follow from nonstrategic analyses. Some new game-theoretic applications are indicated that concern terrorist targeting of businesses, officials, and the general public, where targets can work at cross-purposes as they attempt to deflect the attack. Other novel applications involve government choice among alternative antiterrorism policies, and government concessionary policy when terrorists are either hardliners or moderates in their viewpoint. Directions for future research are also indicated.

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