'Unwilling' versus 'unable': chimpanzees' understanding of human intentional action.

Understanding the intentional actions of others is a fundamental part of human social cognition and behavior. An important question is therefore whether other animal species, especially our nearest relatives the chimpanzees, also understand the intentional actions of others. Here we show that chimpanzees spontaneously (without training) behave differently depending on whether a human is unwilling or unable to give them food Chimpanzees produced more behaviors and left the testing station earlier with an unwilling compared to an unable (but willing) experimenter These data together with other recent studies on chimpanzees' knowledge about others' visual perception show that chimpanzees know more about the intentional actions and perceptions of others than previously demonstrated

[1]  David R. Olson,et al.  Developing theories of intention : social understanding and self-control , 1999 .

[2]  Daniel J Povinelli,et al.  Young and juvenile chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) reactions to intentional versus accidental and inadvertent actions , 1998, Behavioural Processes.

[3]  M. Tomasello,et al.  Distinguishing intentional from accidental actions in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and human children (Homo sapiens). , 1998, Journal of comparative psychology.

[4]  P. L. Adams.  THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN , 1976 .

[5]  A. Meltzoff.  Understanding the Intentions of Others: Re-Enactment of Intended Acts by 18-Month-Old Children. , 1995, Developmental psychology.

[6]  R. Case,et al.  Introduction: reconceptualizing the nature of children's conceptual structures and their development in middle childhood. , 2008, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development.

[7]  Michael Tomasello,et al.  Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) , 2005, Animal Cognition.

[8]  A. Whiten,et al.  Mental evolution and development: Evidence for secondary representation in children, great apes, and other animals. , 2001 .

[9]  David A. Leavens,et al.  Theory of mind in nonhuman primates , 1998, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[10]  D. Povinelli,et al.  What young chimpanzees know about seeing. , 2000, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development.

[11]  M. Tomasello,et al.  Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see , 2000, Animal Behaviour.

[12]  D. Premack,et al.  Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? , 1978, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[13]  Michael Tomasello,et al.  Chimpanzees versus humans: it's not that simple , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[14]  J. Stevenson.  The cultural origins of human cognition , 2001 .

[15]  T Matsuzawa,et al.  Imitation of intentional manipulatory actions in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). , 2000, Journal of comparative psychology.

[16]  M Tomasello,et al.  Production and comprehension of referential pointing by orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). , 1994, Journal of comparative psychology.

[17]  J. Searle.  Intentionality: Name index , 1983 .

[18]  D. Povinelli,et al.  Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[19]  M. Tomasello,et al.  Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? , 2001, Animal Behaviour.

[20]  Sarah's problems of comprehension , 1978, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[21]  M. Tomasello,et al.  Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[22]  Dare A. Baldwin,et al.  Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition , 2001 .

[23]  David A. Leavens,et al.  Intentional communication by chimpanzees: a cross-sectional study of the use of referential gestures. , 1998, Developmental Psychology.

[24]  N. Freeman.  Children's early understanding of mind , 1994 .