论文信息 - Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs

Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs

Abstract. We extend the results of Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel (1991b) to obtain a finite characterization of perfect equilibria in terms of lexicographic probability systems (LPSs). The LPSs we consider are defined over individual strategy sets and thus capture the property of independence among players' actions. Our definition of a product LPS over joint actions of the players is shown to be canonical, in the sense that any independent LPS on joint actions is essentially equivalent to a product LPS according to our definition.

Tilman Klumpp | Srihari Govindan

[1] David M. Kreps,et al. Sequential Equilibria Author ( s ) : , 1982 .

[2] E. Damme. Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept , 1983 .

[3] Lawrence E. Blume,et al. The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium , 1994 .

[4] R. Selten. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 1975, Classics in Game Theory.

[5] A. McLennan. Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory , 1989 .

[6] Marie-Françoise Roy,et al. Real algebraic geometry , 1992 .

[7] David M. Kreps,et al. STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY, CONSISTENCY, AND SEQUENTIAL RATIONALITY , 1987 .

[8] P. Hammond. Elementary Non-Archimedean Representations of Probability for Decision Theory and Games , 1994 .

[9] Philip J. Reny,et al. Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees , 1997 .

[10] Eddie Dekel,et al. Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty , 1991 .