论文信息 - 3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

Abstract. We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

Jérôme Renault | Jérôme Renault

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