Governance Institutions and Economic Activity

Governance Institutions and Economic Activity By AVINASH DIXIT The concept of “governance” has risen from obscurity to buzzword status in just three decades. EconLit shows only 5 mentions of the word governance in the 1970s; by the end of 2008, it was mentioned 33,177 times. The much more specific phrase “economic governance” has appeared 192 times; its more popular cousin, “corporate governance,” 9,717 times. My focus is on economic governance, but I also examine its relation to corporate governance. As with any buzzword, everyone understands the concept a little differently. This is unavoidable, so I will just give my definition for the purpose of this article, and leave it at that. By economic governance I mean the structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure.

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