Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful Mediators
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. Routing Mediators , 2007, IJCAI.
[2] Ioannis Caragiannis,et al. Taxes for linear atomic congestion games , 2006, TALG.
[3] Aaron Roth,et al. Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games , 2013, EC.
[4] Lisa Fleischer,et al. Linear tolls suffice: New bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks , 2005, Theor. Comput. Sci..
[5] Itai Ashlagi,et al. Mediators in position auctions , 2007, EC '07.
[6] Richard Cole,et al. How much can taxes help selfish routing? , 2003, EC '03.
[7] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. Strong mediated equilibrium , 2006, Artif. Intell..
[8] L. Shapley,et al. REGULAR ARTICLEPotential Games , 1996 .
[9] Sampath Kannan,et al. Approximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy) , 2014, SODA.
[10] Chaitanya Swamy,et al. Achieving Target Equilibria in Network Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions , 2014, 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[11] Mohammad Mahdian,et al. Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity networks and generalized congestion games , 2004, 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[12] George Karakostas,et al. Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for heterogeneous selfish users , 2004, 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[13] Justin Hsu,et al. Jointly Private Convex Programming , 2014, SODA.
[14] George Karakostas,et al. On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users , 2010, SAGT.
[15] Kunal Talwar,et al. Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy , 2007, 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07).
[16] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. k-Implementation , 2003, EC '03.
[17] Cynthia Dwork,et al. Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis , 2006, TCC.
[18] Aaron Roth,et al. Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games , 2014, WINE.
[19] Aaron Roth,et al. Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy , 2012, ITCS.
[20] T. Koopmans,et al. Studies in the Economics of Transportation. , 1956 .
[21] S. Morris. COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS , 2001 .
[22] Guy N. Rothblum,et al. Boosting and Differential Privacy , 2010, 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[23] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Private matchings and allocations , 2013, SIAM J. Comput..
[24] Daniel A. Spielman,et al. Spectral Graph Theory and its Applications , 2007, 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07).
[25] L. Shapley,et al. Potential Games , 1994 .
[26] Martin Zinkevich,et al. Online Convex Programming and Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent , 2003, ICML.
[27] M. Slater. Lagrange Multipliers Revisited , 2014 .
[28] Chaitanya Swamy,et al. The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games , 2007, SODA '07.
[29] Ariel D. Procaccia,et al. Implementation by mediated equilibrium , 2010, Int. J. Game Theory.
[30] Prabhakar Raghavan,et al. Randomized rounding: A technique for provably good algorithms and algorithmic proofs , 1985, Comb..
[31] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy , 2010, ITCS '12.
[32] Yoav Freund,et al. Game theory, on-line prediction and boosting , 1996, COLT '96.
[33] Noam Nisan,et al. Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce , 2003 .