Setting the Agenda: Author Index

1. Introduction Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization 5. Final passage votes 6. The costs of agenda control 7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules 8. The bills reported from committee 9. Which way does policy move? Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power 11. Conclusion.

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