暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] M. Eric Johnson,et al. Managing Information Risk and the Economics of Security , 2008, Managing Information Risk and the Economics of Security.
[2] John C. S. Lui,et al. Security adoption and influence of cyber-insurance markets in heterogeneous networks , 2014, Perform. Evaluation.
[3] Quanyan Zhu,et al. On the Detection of Adversarial Attacks against Deep Neural Networks , 2017, SafeConfig@CCS.
[4] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Dynamic Game Analysis and Design of Infrastructure Network Protection and Recovery: 125 , 2017, PERV.
[5] Joseph S. Nye,et al. America's Information Edge , 1996 .
[6] M. Angela Sasse,et al. Users are not the enemy , 1999, CACM.
[7] Marc Lelarge,et al. Cyber Insurance as an Incentivefor Internet Security , 2009, Managing Information Risk and the Economics of Security.
[8] Rui Zhang,et al. Secure and resilient distributed machine learning under adversarial environments , 2015, 2015 18th International Conference on Information Fusion (Fusion).
[9] Frank Kelly,et al. Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability , 1998, J. Oper. Res. Soc..
[10] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Deception by Design: Evidence-Based Signaling Games for Network Defense , 2015, WEIS.
[11] Robert O. Keohane,et al. Power and Interdependence in the Information Age , 1998 .
[12] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A game-theoretic defense against data poisoning attacks in distributed support vector machines , 2017, 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC).
[13] R. Zeckhauser. 19th Annual Lecture of the Geneva Association Insurance and Catastrophes , 1996 .
[14] Oguzhan Alagöz,et al. Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game , 2010, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[15] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Large-Scale Markov Game Approach to Dynamic Protection of Interdependent Infrastructure Networks , 2017, GameSec.
[16] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Secure and practical output feedback control for cloud-enabled cyber-physical systems , 2017, 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS).
[17] Sacha Brostoff,et al. Transforming the ‘Weakest Link’ — a Human/Computer Interaction Approach to Usable and Effective Security , 2001 .
[18] Cynthia E. Irvine,et al. A video game for cyber security training and awareness , 2007, Comput. Secur..
[19] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .
[20] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Game-theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy , 2017, ACM Comput. Surv..
[21] Maxim Finkelstein,et al. Failure Rate Modelling for Reliability and Risk , 2008 .
[22] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Cross-layer secure cyber-physical control system design for networked 3D printers , 2016, 2016 American Control Conference (ACC).
[23] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Deployment and exploitation of deceptive honeybots in social networks , 2012, 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.
[24] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A mean-field stackelberg game approach for obfuscation adoption in empirical risk minimization , 2017, 2017 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP).
[25] Peter Christoffersen,et al. Série Scientifique Scientific Series 2003 s-05 Backtesting Value-at-Risk : A Duration-Based Approach , 2003 .
[26] Stefan Axelsson,et al. Intrusion Detection Systems: A Survey and Taxonomy , 2002 .
[27] D. Sornette,et al. Heavy-tailed distribution of cyber-risks , 2008, 0803.2256.
[28] Samir Chatterjee,et al. Cyber-risk decision models: To insure IT or not? , 2013, Decis. Support Syst..
[29] Thomas Russell,et al. Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets and Uninsurable Risks , 1997 .
[30] Samuel Greengard,et al. The new face of war , 2010, Commun. ACM.
[31] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Dynamic Bayesian Security Game Framework for Strategic Defense Mechanism Design , 2014, GameSec.
[32] Quanyan Zhu,et al. On Multi-Phase and Multi-Stage Game-Theoretic Modeling of Advanced Persistent Threats , 2018, IEEE Access.
[33] Tyler Moore,et al. Information security: where computer science, economics and psychology meet , 2009, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences.
[34] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Secure Control of Communication-Based Train Control Systems Under Jamming Attacks , 2017, SCAV@CPSWeek.
[35] Quanyan Zhu,et al. GUIDEX: A Game-Theoretic Incentive-Based Mechanism for Intrusion Detection Networks , 2012, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.
[36] George A. Akerlof. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism , 1970 .
[37] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Stackelberg game perspective on the conflict between machine learning and data obfuscation , 2016, 2016 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS).
[38] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Resilient control of cyber-physical systems against Denial-of-Service attacks , 2013, 2013 6th International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS).
[39] Konstantinos Psounis,et al. Will cyber-insurance improve network security? A market analysis , 2014, IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.
[40] R. Zeckhauser,et al. Discounting dilemmas: Editors’ introduction , 2008 .
[41] Tyler Moore,et al. Information Security Economics - and Beyond , 2007, DEON.
[42] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Bi-Level Game Approach to Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance of Computer Networks , 2017, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.
[43] Rutvij H. Jhaveri,et al. DoS Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: A Survey , 2012, 2012 Second International Conference on Advanced Computing & Communication Technologies.
[44] Nicholas Bambos,et al. Security Decision-Making among Interdependent Organizations , 2008, 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium.
[45] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Game theory meets network security and privacy , 2013, CSUR.
[46] Jamal Raiyn,et al. A survey of Cyber Attack Detection Strategies , 2014 .
[47] Leda D. Minkova,et al. Insurance Risk Theory , 2010 .
[48] Quanyan Zhu,et al. $\mathtt{FlipIn}$ : A Game-Theoretic Cyber Insurance Framework for Incentive-Compatible Cyber Risk Management of Internet of Things , 2019, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security.
[49] Panos Trimintzios,et al. Resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem , 2011, WEIS.
[50] A. Singh. Exponential Distribution: Theory, Methods and Applications , 1996 .
[51] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Physical Intrusion Games—Optimizing Surveillance by Simulation and Game Theory , 2017, IEEE Access.
[52] Tyler Moore,et al. Security Economics and European Policy , 2008, WEIS.
[53] Rainer Böhme,et al. A Comparison of Market Approaches to Software Vulnerability Disclosure , 2006, ETRICS.
[54] Carol A. Siegel,et al. Cyber-Risk Management: Technical and Insurance Controls for Enterprise-Level Security , 2002, Inf. Secur. J. A Glob. Perspect..
[55] Sushil Jajodia,et al. Moving Target Defense - Creating Asymmetric Uncertainty for Cyber Threats , 2011, Moving Target Defense.
[56] Eitan Altman,et al. A Jamming Game in Wireless Networks with Transmission Cost , 2007, NET-COOP.
[57] Rainer Böhme,et al. Security Metrics and Security Investment Models , 2010, IWSEC.
[58] Rainer Böhme,et al. Security Games with Market Insurance , 2011, GameSec.
[59] Tridib Bandyopadhyay,et al. Why IT managers don't go for cyber-insurance products , 2009, Commun. ACM.
[60] Marc Lelarge,et al. Economic Incentives to Increase Security in the Internet: The Case for Insurance , 2009, IEEE INFOCOM 2009.
[61] Marc Lelarge,et al. A local mean field analysis of security investments in networks , 2008, NetEcon '08.
[62] Leana Golubchik,et al. Analyzing Self-Defense Investments in Internet Security under Cyber-Insurance Coverage , 2010, 2010 IEEE 30th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems.
[63] M. Eric Johnson,et al. Information security and privacy in healthcare: current state of research , 2010, Int. J. Internet Enterp. Manag..
[64] Ian Sommerville,et al. Socio-technical systems: From design methods to systems engineering , 2011, Interact. Comput..
[65] Jean C. Walrand,et al. Can Competitive Insurers Improve Network Security? , 2010, TRUST.
[66] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A cyber-physical game framework for secure and resilient multi-agent autonomous systems , 2015, 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC).
[67] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Moral Hazard in Teams , 1982 .
[68] A. Sandberg,et al. Probing the improbable: methodological challenges for risks with low probabilities and high stakes , 2008, 0810.5515.
[69] Marc Lelarge,et al. A New Perspective on Internet Security using Insurance , 2008, IEEE INFOCOM 2008 - The 27th Conference on Computer Communications.
[70] R. Poovendran,et al. Modeling node capture attacks in wireless sensor networks , 2008, 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing.
[71] Nick Bostrom,et al. Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority , 2013 .
[72] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Strategic Defense Against Deceptive Civilian GPS Spoofing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles , 2017, GameSec.
[73] Sam Peltzman,et al. The effects of automobile safety regulation: Reply , 1976 .
[74] Tyler Moore,et al. The Economics of Information Security , 2006, Science.
[75] Rainer Böhme. Towards Insurable Network Architectures , 2010, it Inf. Technol..
[76] Cynthia Selin,et al. Plausibility and probability in scenario planning , 2014 .
[77] Ross J. Anderson. Cryptography and competition policy: issues with 'trusted computing' , 2003, PODC '03.
[78] Jean C. Walrand,et al. Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security , 2009, WEIS.
[79] Quanyan Zhu,et al. Modeling and Analysis of Leaky Deception Using Signaling Games With Evidence , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security.
[80] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A hybrid stochastic game for secure control of cyber-physical systems , 2018, Autom..
[81] Quanyan Zhu,et al. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Design Secure and Resilient Distributed Support Vector Machines , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems.
[82] Radu Calinescu,et al. Large-scale complex IT systems , 2011, Commun. ACM.
[83] David Hutchison,et al. Event detection and correlation for network environments , 2010, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.
[84] Aron Laszka,et al. The Complexity of Estimating Systematic Risk in Networks , 2014, 2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium.
[85] Asuman E. Ozdaglar,et al. Network Security and Contagion , 2013, PERV.
[86] Branislav Bosanský,et al. Manipulating Adversary's Belief: A Dynamic Game Approach to Deception by Design for Proactive Network Security , 2017, GameSec.
[87] William Yurcik,et al. Cyber-insurance As A Market-Based Solution To The Problem Of Cybersecurity , 2005, WEIS.
[88] Richard J. Zeckhauser,et al. The economics of catastrophes , 1996 .
[89] Annette Hofmann,et al. Internalizing externalities of loss prevention through insurance monopoly: an analysis of interdependent risks , 2007 .