Naïve optimality: Subjects' heuristics can be better motivated than experimenters' optimal models

Is human cognition best described by optimal models, or by adaptive but siiboptimal heuristic strategies? It is frequently hard to identify which theoretical model is normatively best justified. In the context of information search, naive subjects' heuristic strategies are better motivated than some "optimal" models.

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