On the comparative accuracy of lexicographical solutions in cooperative games

This study assesses the relative predictive accuracy of three lexicographical solution concepts within a context of eight 3-person, cooperative, superadditive, side-payment games with non-empty core. The solution concepts include the nucleolus [Schmeidler], the disruption nucleolus [Littlechild/Vaidya], and the 2-center solution [Spinetto, 1971]. The experiment involved 480 subjects (half male, half female) who participated in 160 randomly formed 3-person groups. Results indicate that the disruption nucleolus is significantly more accurate than the nucleolus (p<.01), which in turn is significantly more accurate than the 2-center solution (p<.01). These findings are discussed in terms of the lexicographical structure of the theories.

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