Robust Monetary Policy with Misspecified Models: Does Model Uncertainty Always Call for Attenuated Policy?

We explore Knightian model uncertainty as an explanation for the observed excess persistence and attenuation in estimated interest-rate reaction functions for the United States, relative to what optimal feedback rules would suggest. Two types of uncertainty are identified: (i) unstructured model uncertainty captured in additive shock error processes that result from omitted-variable misspecifications, and (ii) structured model uncertainty, where one or more parameters are posited as the source of misspecification. We estimate a forward-looking model of the U.S. economy, and find that rules for this model that are robust against unstructured model uncertainty, or against one-time parametric shifts, are more aggressive than the optimal linear quadratic rule. However, policies designed to protect the economy against the worst-case consequences of misspecified dynamics are less aggressive and good approximations of the estimated rule. Some drawbacks of robust policies are discussed. Finally, a connection between the degree of structure an authority ascribes to the uncertainty it faces and the extent and likelihood of policy attenuation in response to that uncertainty is explored.

[1]  Allan Drazen,et al.  Political Economy in Macroeconomics , 2018 .

[2]  Kenneth Kasa,et al.  MODEL UNCERTAINTY, ROBUST POLICIES, AND THE VALUE OF COMMITMENT , 2002, Macroeconomic Dynamics.

[3]  Marc P. Giannoni,et al.  DOES MODEL UNCERTAINTY JUSTIFY CAUTION? ROBUST OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A FORWARD-LOOKING MODEL , 2002, Macroeconomic Dynamics.

[4]  Athanasios Orphanides Monetary policy rules based on real-time data , 2001 .

[5]  Glenn D. Rudebusch Is the Fed Too Timid? Monetary Policy in an Uncertain World , 2001, Review of Economics and Statistics.

[6]  Frederic S. Mishkin,et al.  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy: Implications of Model Formulation and Uncertainty , 2000 .

[7]  P. Mercado,et al.  Caution in macroeconomic policy: uncertainty and the relative intensity of policy , 2000 .

[8]  Ulf Söderström Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[9]  T. Sargent,et al.  Robust Permanent Income and Pricing , 1999 .

[10]  Richard D. Porter,et al.  Errors in the measurement of the output gap and the design of monetary policy , 1999 .

[11]  Volker Wieland,et al.  Interest-Rate Smoothing and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence , 1999 .

[12]  Michael Woodford,et al.  Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia , 1999 .

[13]  Ulf Söderström Should central banks be more aggressive , 1999 .

[14]  Alexei Onatski,et al.  ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER MODEL UNCERTAINTY IN A SMALL MODEL OF THE U.S. ECONOMY , 1998, Macroeconomic Dynamics.

[15]  F. Smets Output gap uncertainty: Does it matter for the Taylor rule? , 1998 .

[16]  Laurence Ball Policy Rules for Open Economies , 1998 .

[17]  B. Sack Uncertainty, Learning, and Gradual Monetary Policy , 1998 .

[18]  V. Wieland Monetary Policy and Uncertainty About the Natural Unemployment Rate , 1998 .

[19]  Brian P. Sack,et al.  Does the Fed act gradually? a VAR analysis , 1998 .

[20]  Glenn D. Rudebusch,et al.  Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting , 1998 .

[21]  A. Blinder Central Banking in Theory and Practice , 1998 .

[22]  P. Tinsley,et al.  A guide to FRB/US: a macroeconomic model of the United States , 1996 .

[23]  Anders Rantzer,et al.  Control of uncertain systems: A linear programming approach : By Munther A. Dahleh and Ignacio J. Diaz-Bobillo. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ (1995). ISBN 0-13-280645-2 , 1996, Autom..

[24]  John M. Roberts,et al.  New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve , 1995 .

[25]  J. Doyle,et al.  Robust and optimal control , 1995, Proceedings of 35th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.

[26]  P. Caravani On H∞ criteria for macroeconomic policy evaluation , 1995 .

[27]  M. Dahleh,et al.  Control of Uncertain Systems: A Linear Programming Approach , 1995 .

[28]  T. Sargent,et al.  Discounted linear exponential quadratic Gaussian control , 1995, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control..

[29]  John B. Taylor Discretion versus policy rules in practice , 1993 .

[30]  Marvin Goodfriend,et al.  Interest Rates and the Conduct of Monetary Policy , 1990 .

[31]  George Papavassilopoulos,et al.  A class of risk-sensitive noncooperative games☆ , 1990 .

[32]  P. Khargonekar,et al.  State-space solutions to standard H/sub 2/ and H/sub infinity / control problems , 1989 .

[33]  N. Kiefer,et al.  Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters , 1988 .

[34]  K. Glover,et al.  State-space formulae for all stabilizing controllers that satisfy and H ∞ norm bound and relations to risk sensitivity , 1988 .

[35]  P. Khargonekar,et al.  State-space solutions to standard H2 and H∞ control problems , 1988, 1988 American Control Conference.

[36]  B. Rustem A constrained min-max algorithm for rival models , 1988 .

[37]  Peter W. Glynn,et al.  Optimization of stochastic systems , 1986, WSC '86.

[38]  W. Newey,et al.  A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelationconsistent Covariance Matrix , 1986 .

[39]  G. Calvo Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework , 1983 .

[40]  John B. Taylor Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts , 1980, Journal of Political Economy.

[41]  R. Craine Optimal monetary policy with uncertainty , 1979 .

[42]  Frederick Robertson Macaulay,et al.  Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States Since 1856. , 1938 .

[43]  P. Muehlen Activist vs. Non-Activist Monetary Policy: Optimal Rules under Extreme Uncertainty , 2001 .

[44]  R. Tetlow,et al.  Simplicity Versus Optimality: The Choice of Monetary Policy Rules when Agents Must Learn , 2001 .

[45]  T. Başar Feedback and Optimal Sensitivity: Model Reference Transformations, Multiplicative Seminorms, and Approximate Inverses , 2001 .

[46]  A. Onatski Minimax analysis of model uncertainty : comparison to Bayesian approach , worst possible economies , and optimal robust monetary policies , 1999 .

[47]  T. Sargent,et al.  Five Games and Two Objective Functions that Promote Robustness , 1999 .

[48]  Peter G. Hansen Robustness and Commitment : A Monetary Policy Example by Lars , 1999 .

[49]  John B. Taylor Monetary Policy Rules , 1999 .

[50]  T. Sargent Discussion of ‘ Policy Rules for Open Economies , 1998 .

[51]  Glenn D. Rudebusch,et al.  Policy Rules for In ation Targeting ¤ , 1998 .

[52]  Tamer Başar,et al.  H1-Optimal Control and Related Minimax Design Problems , 1995 .

[53]  Jeffrey C. Fuhrer,et al.  Monetary Policy Trade-offs and the Correlation between Nominal Interest Rates and Real Output , 1995 .

[54]  P. Whittle Risk-Sensitive Optimal Control , 1990 .

[55]  Gary S. Anderson,et al.  A linear algebraic procedure for solving linear perfect foresight models , 1985 .

[56]  Leif Johansen,et al.  Lectures on macroeconomic planning , 1980 .

[57]  G. Chow Analysis and control of dynamic economic systems , 1975 .

[58]  William C. Brainard Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy , 1967 .

[59]  D. D. Sworder,et al.  Minimax Control of Discrete Time Stochastic Systems , 1964 .

[60]  R. F.,et al.  Mathematical Statistics , 1944, Nature.