Game-theoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory

This article evaluates the state of the art and provides an interdisciplinary framework for game-theoretic and behavioral negotiation theory. The former is based on concepts like extensive form, payoff and information structure, and equilibrium concepts. The latter has a foundation in psychology, organization theory, sociology, and related fields. The objectives of the article are to build upon recent advances in both game-theoretic and behavioral negotiation theory, bring the disciplines closer together, and generate a foundation for future research in interdisciplinary negotiation theory. The article develops two interdisciplinary frameworks for game-theoretic and behavioral negotiation theory. Implications of the frameworks are discussed to illustrate their applicability and superiority over earlier frameworks.

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