Game theory.

Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has played a key role in the recent explosion of interest in the field of behavioral economics. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 167-173 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.119 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

[1]  A. Rubinstein.  Modeling Bounded Rationality , 1998 .

[2]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[3]  Avinash Dixit,et al.  The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist's Guide to Success in Business and Life , 2010 .

[4]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .

[5]  Colin Camerer.  Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction , 2003 .

[6]  Kenneth Clark,et al.  When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis , 2000, Int. J. Game Theory.

[7]  P. Reny.  Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information , 1993 .

[8]  Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al.  Dynamic Psychological Games , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.

[9]  Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning? , 2006 .

[10]  David Pearce.  Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection , 1984 .

[11]  C. L. Bouton.  Nim, A Game with a Complete Mathematical Theory , 1901 .

[12]  Aldo Rustichini,et al.  Experience and insight in the Race game , 2010 .

[13]  R. Myerson.  Learning from Schelling s Strategy of Conflict , 2009 .

[14]  A. Rubinstein.  Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model , 1982 .

[15]  M. Rabin.  Published by: American , 2022 .

[16]  M. Johannesson,et al.  Promises, Threats and Fairness , 2004 .

[17]  M. Spence.  Job Market Signaling , 1973 .

[18]  John C. Harsanyi,et al.  Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games , 1989 .

[19]  Rüdeger Baumann,et al.  Games of Strategy , 1982 .

[20]  J. M. Smith,et al.  The Logic of Animal Conflict , 1973, Nature.

[21]  H. W. Kuhn,et al.  11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information , 1953 .

[22]  K. Arrow,et al.  The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics , 2020 .

[23]  Dilip Abreu.  On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting , 1988 .

[24]  J. Weibull,et al.  Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction: The Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten. , 1995 .

[25]  J. Geanakoplos,et al.  Psychological games and sequential rationality , 1989 .

[26]  Eric van Damme,et al.  Non-Cooperative Games , 2000 .

[27]  Gary Charness,et al.  Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..

[28]  F. Forges.  Published by: The , 2022 .

[29]  Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al.  Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[30]  J. Neumann.  Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele , 1928 .

[31]  Martin Dufwenberg,et al.  A theory of sequential reciprocity , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[32]  Martin Dufwenberg,et al.  Epiphany in the Game of 21 , 2010 .

[33]  W. Baumol.  Income and Substitution Effects in the Linder Theorem , 1973 .

[34]  Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau.  Games and Economic Behavior , 2011 .

[35]  Christian Ewerhart,et al.  Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..

[36]  Joel Watson,et al.  Strategy : An Introduction to Game Theory , 2001 .

[37]  R. Myerson.  MULTISTAGE GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION , 1984 .

[38]  T. Schelling,et al.  The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .

[39]  J. Nash.  THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.

[40]  R. Selten,et al.  Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction: The Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, , 1995 .

[41]  B. Bernheim.  Rationalizable Strategic Behavior , 1984 .

[42]  J M Smith,et al.  Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[43]  E. Vandamme.  Stability and perfection of nash equilibria , 1987 .

[44]  M. Dufwenberg,et al.  Hold‐Up: With a Vengeance , 2013 .

[45]  R. Selten.  Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 1975, Classics in Game Theory.