论文信息 - The nonemptiness of thef-core of a game without side payments

The nonemptiness of thef-core of a game without side payments

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions — ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality — are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

Mamoru Kaneko | Myrna Holtz Wooders | M. Kaneko | M. Wooders

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