Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game

Abstract This paper explores the effects of a “selective acceptance” rule on the outcome of two-issue negotiations. The alternating-offer game introduced here allows for the possibility that settlement may be reached on one issue while negotiation continues about the other. This model captures features of laws that are generally believed to increase efficiency. The analysis shows that if one issue is indivisible, there are inefficient subgame perfect equilibria with no Pareto-improving alternative equilibria. With opposing valuations, rapid communication guarantees inefficiency. These are unique examples of this strong form of inefficiency in an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete (and perfect) information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, J30.

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