Fork-free hybrid consensus with flexible Proof-of-Activity

Abstract Bitcoin and its underlying blockchain mechanism have been attracting much attention. One of their core innovations, Proof-of-Work (PoW), is notoriously inefficient which potentially motivates a centralization of hash power, defeating the original goal of decentralization. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is later proposed to replace PoW. However, both PoW and PoS have different inherent advantages and disadvantages, so does Proof-of-Activity (PoA) of Bentov et al. (SIGMETRICS 2014) which only offers limited hybrids of two mechanisms. On the other hand, the hybrid consensus protocol of Pass and Shi (DISC 2017) aims to improve the efficiency by dynamically maintaining a rotating committee. Yet, there are unsatisfactory issues including chain forks and fair committee election. In this paper, we firstly devise a generalized variant of PoW. After that, we leverage our generalized PoW to construct a fork-free hybrid consensus protocol. We further combine our fork-free hybrid consensus mechanism with PoS for a flexible version of PoA with tunable parameters between PoW and PoS. Compared with Bentov et al.’s PoA, our “flexible PoA” improves the efficiency, leading to a more applicable consensus protocol.

[1]  Ariel Gabizon,et al.  Cryptocurrencies Without Proof of Work , 2014, Financial Cryptography Workshops.

[2]  Iddo Bentov,et al.  Proof of Activity: Extending Bitcoin's Proof of Work via Proof of Stake [Extended Abstract]y , 2014, PERV.

[3]  Jeremy Clark,et al.  SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies , 2015, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[4]  Miguel Oom Temudo de Castro,et al.  Practical Byzantine fault tolerance , 1999, OSDI '99.

[5]  Christian Decker,et al.  Bitcoin meets strong consistency , 2014, ICDCN.

[6]  Eric Wustrow,et al.  DDoSCoin: Cryptocurrency with a Malicious Proof-of-Work , 2016, WOOT.

[7]  Sam Toueg,et al.  Fast Distributed Agreement , 1987, SIAM J. Comput..

[8]  Bryan Ford,et al.  Enhancing Bitcoin Security and Performance with Strong Consistency via Collective Signing , 2016, USENIX Security Symposium.

[9]  Silvio Micali,et al.  Algorand: Scaling Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies , 2017, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[10]  Leslie Lamport,et al.  Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults , 1980, JACM.

[11]  Kartik Nayak,et al.  Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus , 2016, ArXiv.

[12]  Elaine Shi,et al.  Hybrid Consensus: Efficient Consensus in the Permissionless Model , 2016, DISC.

[13]  Elaine Shi,et al.  FruitChains: A Fair Blockchain , 2017, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[14]  Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin : A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System , 2009 .

[15]  Leslie Lamport,et al.  The Byzantine Generals Problem , 1982, TOPL.

[16]  Mauro Gallegati,et al.  Pareto's Law of Income Distribution: Evidence for Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States , 2005 .

[17]  Emin Gün Sirer,et al.  Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable , 2013, Financial Cryptography.

[18]  Björn Scheuermann,et al.  Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies , 2016, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials.

[19]  Markus Jakobsson,et al.  Proofs of Work and Bread Pudding Protocols , 1999, Communications and Multimedia Security.

[20]  Melanie Swan,et al.  Blockchain Thinking : The Brain as a Decentralized Autonomous Corporation [Commentary] , 2015, IEEE Technol. Soc. Mag..

[21]  Felix Leopoldo,et al.  Proof of Work , 2011, Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security.

[22]  Sushmita Ruj,et al.  Retricoin: Bitcoin based on compact proofs of retrievability , 2016, ICDCN.