Bargaining with Outside Options

We begin by reviewing the theory of two-person bargaining and three-person bargaining over a unit of wealth in the presence of outside options. We then explore the implications and developments in the literature for bargaining games with more than three players, and in particular, for legislative bargaining games in a democratic assembly with many members who decide by majority rule how to divide a unit of wealth, or an infinite sequence of units of wealth.

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