Comprehensive survey on privacy-preserving protocols for sealed-bid auctions

Abstract The internet is a ubiquitous technology that has changed conventional human interactions. In our present time, it is not unusual for financial transactions to take place virtually with nothing more than a computer and a credit card; many times without ever having to engage face-to-face with another person. Part of these electronic transactions taking place day-to-day are not simple economic mechanisms, instead they are constructed in the form of auctions in which a key aspect is the protection of bidders. Ideally, electronic auction mechanisms should provide the following fundamental properties: privacy of the losing bids, robustness, verifiability, and non-repudiation. This can only be accomplished by proper sealed-bid auction protocols. Indeed, the main motivation for constructing sealed-bid auction protocols is the fact that auctioneers and/or sellers may use the past losing bids to maximize their revenues in future auctions and negotiations. In addition, private valuations can be used to disclose personal preferences and private information about the bidders. This paper therefore surveys existing cryptographic solutions that are used for electronic sealed-bid auction protocols, and provides the challenges that currently exist in this field. Overall, various technical approaches will be covered and the state-of-the-art will be reviewed thoroughly.

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