论文信息 - Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings

Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings

In this paper, we show that Arrow's and Wilson's theorems hold for permutation, symmetric permutation and symmetric domains. Permutation domains concern assignments: n indivisible private goods are distributed betweenn selfish individuals. Symmetric permutation domains concern matchings: two sets ofn selfish individuals being given, pairs with an individual from each set are to be made. Symmetric domains concern pairings: a set of 2n selfish individuals being given,n pairs of individuals are to be made.

M. Breton | Georges Bordes | M. Le Breton | G. Bordes

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