Lever: Breaking the Shackles of Scalable On-chain Validation

Blockchain brings dawn to decentralized applications which coordinate correct computations without a prior trust. However, existing scalable on-chain frameworks are incompetent in dealing with intensive validation. On the one hand, duplicated execution pattern leads to limited throughput and unacceptable expenses. On the other hand, there lack fair and secure incentive mechanisms allocating rewards according to the actual workload of validators, thus deriving bad dilemmas among rational participants and inducing effective attacks from shrewd adversaries. While most solutions rely on off-chain patterns to sidestep the shackles, it further introduces unexpected issues in applicability, fairness and brittle dependency on interactive cooperation. The intrinsic bottleneck of backbone has never been drastically broken. This work presents Lever, the first scalable on-chain framework which supports intensive validation, meanwhile achieves validity, incentive compatibility and cost-efficiency tolerance of f < n/4 Byzantine participants. Lever firstly integrates the evaluation of complexity into the correctness of transaction, thoroughly decoupling intensive validation from regular backbone consensus. Significant scalability is then achieved by launching few rounds of novel validation-challenge game between potential adversaries and rational stakeholders; compelling incentive mechanism effectively transfers deposits of adversary to specialized rewards for honest validators, therefore allows the user to lever sufficient endorsement for verification with minimum cost. Combined with game-theoretic insights, a backstop protocol is designed to ensure finality and validity of the framework, breaking through the famous Verifier’s Dilemma. Finally, we streamline Lever under the efficient architecture of sharding, which jointly shows robust to conceivable attacks on validation and performs outstanding ability to purify Byzantine participants. Experimental results show that Lever vastly improves the throughput and reduces expenses of intensive validation with slight compromise in latency.

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