Comparing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal for Diffie-Hellman Protocols

Both the "eCK" model, by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin, and the "CK01" model, by Canetti and Krawczyk, address the effect of leaking session specific ephemeral data on the security of key establishment schemes. The CK01-adversary is given a SessionStateReveal query to learn session-specific private data defined by the protocol specification, whereas the eCK-adversary is equipped with an EphemeralKeyReveal query to access all ephemeral private input required to carry session computations. SessionStateReveal cannot be issued against the test session; by contrast EphemeralKeyReveal can be used against the test session under certain conditions. On the other hand, it is not obvious how EphemeralKeyReveal compares to SessionStateReveal . Thus it is natural to ask which model is more useful and practically relevant. While formally the models are not comparable, we show that recent analyses utilizing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal have a similar approach to ephemeral data leakage. First we pinpoint the features that determine the approach. Then by examining common motives for ephemeral data leakage we conclude that the approach is meaningful, but does not take into account timing, which turns out to be critical for security. Lastly, for Diffie-Hellman protocols we argue that it is important to consider security when discrete logarithm values of the outgoing ephemeral public keys are leaked and offer a method to achieve security even if these values are exposed.