论文信息 - Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem

Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem

Abstract This paper introduces a special matching problem, the stable residence exchange problem, originated from the need for residence exchange in China. The problem involves families wishing to exchange their residences based on their preferences. The stability of exchange is defined and the problem can be formed as a special case of trading indivisible goods with preferences. The solution method and the properties of the solution are discussed and the factors that may affect the performance of the residence exchange are investigated through computer simulation. Finally, the application considerations are addressed.

Yufei Yuan | Yufei Yuan

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