An Exploration on On-line Mass Collaboration: Focusing on its Motivation Structure

The Internet has become an indispensable part of our lives. Witnessing recent web-based mass collaboration, e.g. Wikipedia, people are questioning whether the Internet has made fundamental changes to the society or whether it is merely a hyperbolic fad. It has long been assumed that collective action for a certain goal yields the problem of free-riding, due to its non-exclusive and non-rival characteristics. Then, thanks to recent technological advances, the on-line space experienced the following changes that enabled it to produce public goods: 1) decrease in the cost of production or coordination 2) externality from networked structure 3) production function which integrates both self-interest and altruism. However, this research doubts the homogeneity of on-line mass collaboration and argues that a more sophisticated and systematical approach is required. The alternative that we suggest is to connect the characteristics of the goal to the motivation. Despite various approaches, previous literature fails to recognize that motivation can be structurally restricted by the characteristic of the goal. First we draw a typology of on-line mass collaboration with ‘the extent of expected beneficiary’ and ‘the existence of externality’, and then we examine each combination of motivation using Benkler’s framework. Finally, we explore and connect such typology with its possible dominant participating motivation Keywords—On-line Cooperation, Typology, Mass Collaboration, Motivation, Wikinomics.

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