论文信息 - Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II : Analysis of specific bargaining games

Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II : Analysis of specific bargaining games

Abstract Part II of the paper (for Part I see Harsanyi (1982)) describes the actual solutions the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory provides for some important classes of bargaining games, such as unanimity games; trade between one seller and several potential buyers; and two-person bargaining games with incomplete information on one side or on both sides. It also discusses some concepts and theorems useful in computing the solution; and explains how our concept of risk dominance enables us to analyze game situations in terms of some intuitively very compelling probabilistic (subjective-probability) considerations disallowed by classical game theory.

John C. Harsanyi | J. Harsanyi

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