Maximization of Multi-Round Network Survivability under Considerations of the Defender's Defensive Messaging Strategies

Nowadays, enterprises face many challenges of cyber security. How to efficiently allocate defensive resources to reduce damages which are caused by cyber attackers and evaluate system survivability to keeping services operating became important issues. Hence, we develop a scenario of that both cyber attacker and network defender are with incompletely understanding the information about each other is considered. We conduct a mathematical model for analyze this problem for the decision makers to resolve these dilemmas. The Average DOD is then applied to evaluate damage degree of network to estimate all possible strategies which both cyber attacker and network defender would take. Moreover, network defender could release message which might be doing nothing at all, truth, secrecy or deception to confuse cyber attacker to achieve better defense efficiency. In the process of problem solving, the "gradient method" and "game theory" would be used to obtain the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and network defender.

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