A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol

People do bargain over how to bargain. We examine the role of individuals’ ability to pursue certain bargaining protocols in a multi-agent bilateral bargaining model. Bargaining protocols are not completely settled, but will emerge endogenously in equilibrium. We show that players’ ability to partially influence bargaining protocols plays a crucial role in determining equilibrium outcomes. When discounting is not too high, there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria, including inefficient ones. As the number of players increases, both the set of discount factors that support multiple equilibrium outcomes and the set of the first proposing player’s equilibrium payoffs expand. The maximum loss of efficiency increases with respect to the discount factor.

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