Game theory-based identification of facility use restrictions for the movement of hazardous materials under terrorist threat

Government agencies can determine which specific facilities in a transportation network to restrict for each class of material and for which times of the day and/or week to stem the consequences of a terrorist event. To guide in making these determinations, this paper develops a three-player game of the interactions among a government agency, a carrier, and a terrorist. It also develops an effective solution procedure for this game and illustrates the use of that procedure on a realistic case study based on the freight rail network in the continental United States.

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