Apply STAMP to Critical Infrastructure Protection

Classical risk-based or game theoretic security models rely on assumptions from reliability theory and rational expectations economics that are not applicable for security risks. Additionally, these models suffer from serious deficiencies when they are applied to software-intensive, complex engineering systems. Recent work in the area of system safety engineering has led to the development of a new accident model for system safety that acknowledges the dynamic complexity of accidents. System-theoretic accident models and processes (STAMP) applies principles from control theory to enforce constraints on hazards and thereby prevent accidents. Appreciating the similarities between safety and security while still acknowledging the differences, this paper introduces the use of STAMP to security problems. In particular, it is applied to identify and mitigate the threats that could emerge in critical infrastructure systems such as the air transportation network.

[1]  Vicki M. Bier,et al.  Game-Theoretic and Reliability Methods in Counterterrorism and Security , 2006 .

[2]  David L. Banks,et al.  Combining Game Theory and Risk Analysis in Counterterrorism: A Smallpox Example , 2006 .

[3]  Nancy G. Leveson,et al.  A new accident model for engineering safer systems , 2004 .

[4]  Nicolas Dulac,et al.  A framework for dynamic safety and risk management modeling in complex engineering systems , 2007 .

[5]  George E Apostolakis,et al.  How Useful Is Quantitative Risk Assessment? , 2004, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[6]  Joseph R. Laracy,et al.  Addressing System Boundary Issues in Complex Socio-Technical Systems , 2007 .

[7]  B. Frey,et al.  How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence , 2003 .

[8]  Ronald D. Fricker,et al.  Game Theory in an Age of Terrorism: How Can Statisticians Contribute? , 2006 .

[9]  Colin J. Fidge,et al.  Fault evaluation for security-critical communication devices , 2006, Computer.

[10]  Dean A. Wilkening,et al.  A simple model for calculating ballistic missile defense effectiveness , 2000 .

[11]  T. Sandler,et al.  Terrorism & Game Theory , 2003 .

[12]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.

[13]  Joseph R. Laracy.  A Systems Theoretic Accident Model Applied to Biodefense , 2006 .

[14]  Alyson G. Wilson,et al.  Statistical methods in counterterrorism : game theory, modeling, syndromic surveillance, and biometric authentication , 2006 .

[15]  Julian Palmore, Françoise Melese.  A Game Theory View of Preventive Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack , 2001 .

[16]  Donn B. Parker,et al.  Risks of risk-based security , 2007, Commun. ACM.

[17]  David Michaud,et al.  Methodology for Ranking the Elements of Water-Supply Networks , 2006 .