Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading

Abstract This paper revisits Myerson and Satterthwaite 's ( 1983 ) classic analysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading, replacing equilibrium with a level-k model of strategic thinking and focusing on direct mechanisms. The revelation principle fails for level-k models, so restricting attention to direct mechanisms and imposing incentive-compatibility are not without loss of generality. If, however, only direct, level-k-incentive-compatible mechanisms are feasible and traders' levels are observable, Myerson and Satterthwaite's characterization of mechanisms that maximize traders' total surplus subject to incentive constraints generalizes qualitatively to level-k models. If only direct, level-k-incentive-compatible mechanisms are feasible but traders' levels are not observable, generically a particular posted-price mechanism maximizes traders' total expected surplus subject to incentive constraints. If direct, non-level-k-incentive-compatible mechanisms are feasible and traders best respond to them, total expected surplus-maximizing mechanisms may take completely different forms.

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