FPGA based optimization for masked AES implementation

Masking methods are popularly used to defend against power analysis attacks in embedded systems. Apart from power analysis attack, there also exists glitch attack when porting the design to gate level. In this paper, we firstly divided the existing masking methods into different types according to their functions, masking value and applications. Secondly, we compared different masked S-box hardware implementation. Finally, we proposed the masked AES encryption with 32-bit and 128-bit data path hardware implementation. The experimental results show that our proposed design takes up less hardware resources and has the ability to defend against differential power analysis(DPA) and glitch attacks.

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