Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments

We present an experiment investigating why contributions decline in repeated public goods games. To distinguish between alternative explanations for this decrease we use a strategy method to elicit strategies in a simple two-stage public goods game. By repeating the game with new opponents participants have the opportunity to learn across games. We find that the behavior elicited using the strategy method is consistent with that of a direct response version of the game. Contributions in stage two are around 45% lower than contributions in stage one. While this pattern of declining contributions is robust across repetitions of the two-stage game, the participants’ strategies are not. Changes in individual strategies across successive repetitions sometimes increase and sometimes decrease stage-one contributions, on average contributions decrease by 7% per game. Thus experience with the game leads to an erratic and less pronounced deterioration in contributions, compared with the systematic and more marked deterioration generated by submitted strategies.

[1]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .

[2]  J. Brandts,et al.  Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games , 1998 .

[3]  C. Keser.  Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments * , 2022 .

[4]  H. Sauermann.  Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung , 1967 .

[5]  Vernon L. Smith,et al.  Handbook of Experimental Economic Results , 2008 .

[6]  J. Andreoni.  Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion? , 1995 .

[7]  Thomas R. Palfrey,et al.  Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments , 1996 .

[8]  James Andreoni,et al.  Why free ride?: Strategies and learning in public goods experiments , 1988 .

[9]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism , 1988 .

[10]  Jordi Brandts,et al.  Truth or Consequences: An Experiment , 2002, Manag. Sci..

[11]  Werner Güth,et al.  The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[12]  C. Engel.  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization , 2015 .

[13]  Martin Sefton,et al.  Communication and Efficiency in Coordination Game Experiments , 2005 .

[14]  Rachel T. A. Croson.  Partners and strangers revisited , 1996 .

[15]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[16]  Urs Fischbacher,et al.  Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods , 2006, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[17]  Daniel Houser,et al.  Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments , 2002 .

[18]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment , 2001 .

[19]  J. Andreoni,et al.  Chapter 82 Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments , 1998 .

[20]  J. Kagel,et al.  Handbook of Experimental Economics , 1997 .