Non-Cooperative Games

We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria). Motivated by experiments that show systematic theory violations, behavioral game theory aims to integrate insights from psychology to get better answers to the question ‘how do humans play?’. We provide an overview of the observed regularities and briefly sketch (beginnings of) theories of boundedly rational play. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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