Five AI Challenges in Strategyproof Computing

Computational systems are now distributed by default, and designed, owned and used by multiple self-interested parties. In the face of this growing system complexity, we need a unifying design paradigm, that supports continued innovation and competition while promoting easy deployment, operation, and use. Focusing on the central problem of resource allocation—the arbitration of shared resources among the competing demands of users—we introduce a paradigm of strategyproof computing, a vision in which individual users can treat other resources as their own. We layout the benefits of strategyproof computing, and identify five AI challenges in making this vision a reality.

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