Comparing Prisoner's Dilemma, Commons Dilemma, and Public Goods Provision Designs in Laboratory Experiments

The ability to cumulate and compare findings from laboratory experiments is impeded by the wide variety of designs employed in these studies and by the different incentive characteristics embedded in those designs. This article attempts to improve potential for comparing findings by proposing variables that specify incentive features of collective action designs. For many designs as seemingly disparate as those in prisoner's dilemma, commons dilemma, and public goods provision games, these specifications should enable different designs to be represented as values along common incentive parameters. With this procedure, the influence of incentives can be assessed and controlled across disparate experimental designs as well as the cumulative influence of other variables (for example, group size and identity, framing, and socioeconomic characteristics of subjects) that provoke collective action behavior. The article also notes the limitations of this procedure and other obstacles to the meaningful cumulation of findings on collective action. The procedure may not, for example, allow easy comparison of findings from experimental designs that have disparate nonlinear returns to cost contributions.

[1]  D. Austen-Smith.  Voluntary Pressure Groups , 1981 .

[2]  V. Smith.  Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions , 1980 .

[3]  N. Frohlich,et al.  Beyond Economic Man , 1984 .

[4]  J. Edney,et al.  The commons problem: Alternative perspectives. , 1980 .

[5]  Vernon L. Smith,et al.  Papers in Experimental Economics: Incentive Compatible Experimental Processes for the Provision of Public Goods , 1979 .

[6]  E. Savas.  Alternatives for Delivering Public Services , 1978 .

[7]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations , 1984 .

[8]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1979, American Journal of Sociology.

[9]  C. Plott.  The Application of Laboratory Experimental Methods to Public Choice , 1979 .

[10]  Jon Elster,et al.  The Cement Of Society , 1991 .

[11]  G. Hardin,et al.  The Tragedy of the Commons , 1968, Green Planet Blues.

[12]  J. Alcock,et al.  Predisposition and Behaviour in a Collective Dilemma , 1977 .

[13]  Glenn Herald Snyder,et al.  “Prisoner's Dilemma” and “Chicken” Models in International Politics , 1971 .

[14]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .

[15]  A. Przeworski,et al.  Theories in Search of a Curve: A Contextual Interpretation of Left Vote , 1971, American Political Science Review.

[16]  D. Snidal.  Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations , 1979 .

[17]  Douglas S. Noonan,et al.  Managing the Commons , 1978 .

[18]  Robert D. Tollison,et al.  The Rise and Decline of Nations , 1983 .

[19]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .

[20]  A. Rapoport,et al.  Prisoner's Dilemma , 1965 .

[21]  Mark A Walker,et al.  The free rider problem: Experimental evidence , 1984 .

[22]  Todd Sandler,et al.  Collective Action: Theory and Applications , 1992 .

[23]  M. Jones-Lee,et al.  Beyond Economic Man. , 1977 .

[24]  J. Orbell,et al.  Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma , 1978, American Political Science Review.

[25]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible , 1992, American Political Science Review.

[26]  P. Slovic,et al.  Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective , 1983 .

[27]  Elinor Ostrom,et al.  The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems , 1990 .

[28]  Michael Taylor.  The possibility of cooperation , 1987 .

[29]  M. Brewer,et al.  Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. , 1984, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[30]  V. Smith.  Papers in experimental economics , 1991 .

[31]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism , 1988 .

[32]  V. Smith,et al.  Research in Experimental Economics , 1979 .

[33]  J. Elster,et al.  The Cement Of Society , 1989 .

[34]  J. Head,et al.  Public Goods, Private Goods, and Ambiguous Goods , 1969 .

[35]  Robyn M. Dawes,et al.  Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation. , 1977 .

[36]  A. Rapoport.  Game theory as a theory of conflict resolution , 1974 .

[37]  J. Kagan,et al.  Rational choice in an uncertain world , 1988 .

[38]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1980, American Journal of Sociology.

[39]  G. Marwell,et al.  Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV , 1981 .

[40]  Jerry I. Shaw,et al.  Varying Patterns of Reward Cooperation , 1975 .

[41]  Todd Sandler,et al.  The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods , 1986 .

[42]  John Orbell,et al.  Explaining discussion-induced cooperation. , 1988 .

[43]  Peter Bohm,et al.  Estimating the demand for public goods: An experiment , 1972 .

[44]  D. J. Roberts,et al.  Exclusion, Externalities, and Public Goods , 1973 .

[45]  A. Rapoport.  Prisoner’s Dilemma — Recollections and Observations , 1974 .

[46]  Anatol Rapoport,et al.  The 2 X 2 game , 1976 .

[47]  J. Elster.  Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action , 1985, Ethics.

[48]  John R. Chamberlin.  Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size , 1974, American Political Science Review.