What Information Theory Says About Best Response and About Binding Contracts

Product Distribution (PD) theory is the information-theoretic extension of conventional full- rationality game theory to bounded rational games. Here PD theory is used to investigate games in which the players use bounded rational best-response strategies. This investigation illuminates how to determine the optimal organization chart for a corporation, or more generally how to order the sequence of moves of the players / employees so as to optimize an overall objective function. It is then shown that in the continuum-time limit, bounded rational best response games result in a variant of the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. This variant is then investigated for team games, in which the players share the same utility function, by showing that such continuum- limit bounded rational best response is identical to Newton-Raphson iterative optimization of the shared utility function. Next PD theory is used to investigate changing the coordinate system of the game, i.e., changing the mapping from the joint move of the players to the arguments in the utility functions. Such a change couples those arguments, essentially by making each players move be an offered binding contract.

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