论文信息 - On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling - 字舞流文

On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling

We consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.

Jérôme Renault | Jérôme Renault

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