The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics

In this paper, we develop a model for the timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. The defender moves first and the attacker second in a two-stage game which is repeated over T periods. We study the effects of dynamics of several critical components of counter-terrorism games, including the unit defence costs (eg, immediately after an attack, the defender would easily acquire defensive funding), unit attack costs (eg, the attacker may accumulate resources as time goes), and the asset valuation (eg, the asset valuation may change over time). We study deterministic dynamics and conduct simulations using random dynamics. We determine the timing of terrorist attacks and how these can be deterred.

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